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ABSTRACT 
A pronounced drop in crime since the early 1990s has encompassed every crime category 
tracked by the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports, including property crime. However, over 
the same period, the rates of Online Property Crime (OPC) have been on the rise 
according to available evidence. We delineate the extent of our knowledge and data 
concerning cyber crime and identity theft and, using data from several nationally 
representative victimization surveys, offer an alternative view of property crime trends 
while pointing out the glaring gap in crime reporting and accounting in relation to the 
growing category of property crimes perpetrated online. In addition, we compare 
estimated costs of traditional property crime versus online property crime.  Finally, we 
identify the main challenges for obtaining reliable data on online property crime and 
discuss their implications, especially when applying the traditional methods of compiling 
crime statistics. 
INTRODUCTION: DID CRIME DROP OR DID WE DROP THE BALL? 
A pronounced drop in crime since the early 1990s has encompassed every crime 
category tracked by the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports (Truman, 2011; U.S. Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, 2013). It has affected property crime (burglary, larceny/theft, 
motor vehicle theft, etc.) as well as violent crime (homicide, robbery, rape, etc.). Over the 
same period, the rates of internet-perpetrated crime – often in the forms of identity theft, 
fraud, and cyber-attacks on organizational computer networks, among others – have been 
on the rise according to available sources of data (Allison, Schuck, and Lersch, 2005; 
Langton, 2011; Newman, 2009a; Symantec, 2012; U.S. Federal Trade Commission, 
3	  
2004, 2008, 2012).  Notwithstanding these contrary trends, criminologists frame crime 
trends since the 1990s within the paradigm of a ‘crime drop’ (Blumstein and Wallman, 
2005; Goldberger and Rosenfeld, 2008), and have generally neglected the possibility that 
official statistics are an increasingly incomplete reflection of the extent of criminal 
activity in the United States.  This paper explores the implications of that possible 
omission. 
In this paper, we delineate the extent of our knowledge and data concerning 
Online Property Crime (OPC) and offer an alternative view of property crime trends 
generally while pointing out the glaring gap in crime reporting and accounting in relation 
to the crimes perpetrated online, which are likely growing in number. In addition, we 
compare estimated costs of traditional property crime to those of OPC. Finally, we 
identify the main challenges in obtaining reliable data on OPC, especially when applying 
the traditional methods of compiling crime statistics. The framework offered in the 
current article challenges the traditional perception of property crime as following the 
same downward trend as violent crime. It is our hope that the discussion started here will 
facilitate efforts to gather relevant information to track the trends in OPC more 
accurately. 
DEFINING AND COUNTING ONLINE PROPERTY CRIME1 
We use the term Online Property Crime to cover a wide variety of property crimes 
perpetrated online including identity theft, credit card theft and fraud, cyber attacks on 
organizational networks resulting in security breaches, the buying and selling of personal 
1 We are grateful to one of our anonymous reviewers for raising several of the definitional points in this 
section. 
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data online, and the use of unsuspecting people’s computers for 
spamming/phishing/illegal hosting (see Cheney, 2003, 2005; Anderson et al., 2012 for 
the discussion of definitions and types of online property offenses).  Two aspects of this 
definition are worth highlighting: that OPC is perpetrated online, and that it involves the 
theft of property.  We discuss the importance of these distinctions below. 
Defining a crime as ‘perpetrated online’ is not a simple matter.  Some types of 
OPC have a significant offline component. For example, identity theft and credit card 
fraud can and often do result from “dumpster diving”, theft from mailboxes, or stealing 
relatives’ personal information through paper documents (Allison et al., 2005; Elbirt, 
2005; White and Fisher, 2008; Copes and Vieraitis, 2009; Morris, 2010).  When 
fraudulent transactions are reported, it is often impossible to infer exactly how the 
information was obtained, or even how it was exploited.  Accordingly, in our review of 
the data that follows, we are at pains to distinguish between sources which focus 
exclusively on crime perpetrated online, as our definition requires, and those which 
aggregate data on an overlapping, but distinct, quantity of criminal activity. 
Establishing that property was taken in a perpetration of an online crime is also 
complex.  If the ‘property’ at issue is a person’s identity, a problem is created because 
some victims of online identity theft never become aware that their details have been 
stolen, and indeed do not lose their identity so much as ‘share’ it with the criminal.  
Others may have their details exploited to obtain products or services but will suffer no 
direct loss themselves – arguably a crime more similar to defamation than ‘theft’, at least 
as far as the original owner of the data is concerned.  Equally, online property crime may 
result in no direct profit to the criminal in cases where, rather than seeking financial 
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payouts, the criminal steals intellectual property which may then be exploited in other 
ways.  Accordingly, as we review the data that follows, we consider the types of property 
at issue and problems related to the quantification of property lost. 
Additionally, other factors may bias or inhibit full documentation of OPC.  
Insurance company requirements that victims report losses to the police may bias data in 
favor of higher value losses, while the active encouragement to report fraud offered by 
websites such as eBay may have other skewing effects (see House of Lords Science and 
Technology Committee, 2007, p.110).  Equally, changing technology itself may influence 
target selection by criminals.  As Biderman and Reiss noted in 1967, crime data produced 
by organizations responsible for policing or adjudication “are not some objectively 
observable universe of ‘criminal acts’, but rather those events defined, captured, and 
processed as such by some institutional mechanism” (p. 1).  Accordingly, we sought to 
remain continually vigilant of what is referred to elsewhere as the ‘dark figure’ problem – 
that is, factors that cause reported statistics to diverge from (and generally 
underrepresent) the true nature and extent of crime. 
Notwithstanding these significant challenges, there is a pressing need to count 
online property crime for two reasons.  First, it is likely that it is increasing. Internet 
usage has increased dramatically in the United States in recent decades, such that in 
September of 2012, 81% of American adults and 95% of teens accessed the internet (Pew 
Research Center, 2013). This change can be reasonably compared to other expansions of 
human activity through time and space. Melbin (1978) showed how the expansion of 
human activities past dusk, facilitated by the introduction of electric lighting into newly 
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settled territories in the West, had an impact on crime. Every time human activity crosses 
new ‘frontiers’, crime seems to follow. 
Second, the potential harm from OPC is unknown.  In the case of property crime, 
‘harmfulness’ is almost always quantified in terms of the financial losses accrued by the 
victim (Davies, 2012).  Data on losses from property crime are, in fact, regularly 
published by the FBI, though no facility is provided to allow a breakdown of online vs. 
offline crimes which, alongside other concerns about the representativeness of the FBI’s 
data, makes it impossible to check how much harm OPC is causing or to relate it to more 
familiar measures such as the financial harm caused by other thefts.  Accordingly, 
rendering a reasonably satisfactory picture of the quantity of financial losses that accrue 
from OPC is critical to our ability to track its seriousness as a social problem. 
Detecting the ‘true’ extent of OPC poses questions that are not only conceptual, 
therefore, but also methodologically technical.  In what follows, we consider specifically 
the limitations of official statistics, victimization surveys and other approaches to data 
collection when applied to the problem of counting OPC in order to make the case that 
greater attention should be devoted to assessing the harmfulness and prevalence of OPC 
in the United States. 
THE SIZE OF THE PROBLEM: HOW PREVALENT IS OPC? 
At the same time as traditional property crime has fallen nationally, the online 
market for personal and financial data has formed (see Holt and Lampke, 2010 for an 
empirical study of such online marketplaces). After 2004, according to Moore and his 
colleagues (2009), identity theft and credit card fraud became increasingly organized and 
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elaborate, evolving from a problem of ‘insiders’ with access to sensitive information 
(such as store attendants) to one with a novel division of labor.  Phishermen (and 
sometimes spammers) would send out emails and viruses to attract naïve customers to 
fake bank web sites requesting a person to enter their bank account number and password 
for ‘confirmation’ or to avoid ‘suspension of the account’.  Botnet herders would 
manipulate infected computers to gather keystroke information and to direct these 
computers – unbeknownst to their owners – to execute specific programs, host fake web 
sites and online pharmacies, and send out spam emails.  Brokers and cashiers would buy 
bank account information in bulk and would in turn hire unsuspecting money mules 
(through job advertisements for positions of ‘transaction processor’ or ‘account 
executive’) to accept money transfers from these stolen bank accounts into their own 
accounts, keep a commission, and then irretrievably transfer the rest of the money 
through Western Union (or other untraceable means) to the cashiers (Moore, Clayton, 
and Anderson, 2009). In 2011, Symantec reported the price for 10,000 bots (infected 
computers acting as ‘robots’ on commands) was around $15, while stolen credit card 
numbers could fetch between $0.07 and $100 each (Symantec, 2011, p. 6). 
When it comes to understanding the scope and incidence of conventional, non-
online crime types, criminal justice researchers and professionals have several options. 
Traditional ways of measuring crime include official statistics from the FBI’s Uniform 
Crime Reports (UCR), victimization survey data (from both individuals and businesses 
affected), and self-reported crime and delinquency from various sources (though there is 
no uniform nationally representative survey of self-reported crime involvement with large 
samples of adults – see Addington, 2010, for an overview.) Of the three main sources of 
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crime measurement, official statistics and victimization data are, at least in theory, most 
relevant for providing information about the extent of OPC. Additionally, these are the 
only sources of data that presently have the potential to derive national estimates of the 
scope of the problem in the United States. 
The differences between measures of crime reported to (and by) the police 
reproduced in the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) program and measures of 
victimization gleaned from NCVS have been analyzed and dissected extensively 
(Biderman and Lynch, 1991; Loftin and McDowall, 2010; Lynch and Addington, 2007; 
Mosher, Miethe, and Phillips, 2002; Savitz, 1978; Skogan, 1977, 1984; Xie et al., 2006; 
Zawitz et al., 2003). This literature has two lessons with particular relevance for 
interpreting data in relation to OPC.  First, existing research shows consistently that a 
much smaller proportion of victims of property crime report their victimization compared 
to victims of violent crime.  Second, the most prominent reasons that victims of property 
crime do not report their victimization are threefold: the crime or its resultant losses are 
minor enough that they are not worth the time and effort of reporting, the property was 
recovered, or victims do not believe police could help recover the property (Skogan, 
1984; Harlow, 1985; Hart & Rennison, 2003).  Accordingly, when assessing the validity 
of data on the prevalence of OPC nationally, existing research suggests strongly that the 
extent of the problem will be underestimated in official statistics (White & Fisher, 2008), 
and that there will be an overrepresentation of high-loss crimes2.  
2 There is also a possibility that the need to create a record of a crime for insurance purposes will play an 
important role in biasing the types of crimes reported, though we note there is only limited evidence for the 
importance of insurance as an incentive to report crimes in other areas (Skogan, 1984; Harlow, 1985; Hart 
& Rennison, 2003). 
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According to the broad consensus among criminology researchers, backed up by 
the UCR reports, property crime has been declining since the early 1990s in the United 
States (Blumstein and Wallman, 2005; Levitt, 2004; Mishra and Lalumière, 2009; 
Zimring, 2006) as well as internationally (Mishra and Lalumière, 2009; Tseloni et al., 
2010). Of course, OPC does not appear as a specific category in the Uniform Crime 
Report estimates compiled by the FBI, upon which so much research and speculation 
regarding crime trends are based (U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2013).  Rather 
the observation of this decline in property crime is based on counts of burglary, larceny-
theft, motor vehicle theft, and (to a limited extent) arson. 
Several explanations have been offered to account for the overall crime decline. 
Levitt (2004) summarized the most commonly cited hypotheses for the fall in crime rates: 
increased imprisonment; the aging of the population (i.e., the drop in the proportion of 
high-risk youth); improved economic conditions; innovative police strategies (e.g., ‘hot 
spots’ and ‘community policing’); changes in gun control laws; increased use of the death 
penalty; increased numbers of police officers; the legalization of abortion and attendant 
reduced number of unwanted, at-risk children; and the decline in crack-cocaine 
consumption. Levitt’s list is not exhaustive; others have suggested that growths in 
immigration may account for a reduction in crime (Wadsworth, 2010), particularly 
violent offending, or that changes in “youth culture,” observed by qualitative researchers 
in inner-city neighborhoods, may also explain the crime drop (Curtis, 1998). While a few 
of these explanations find more empirical support than others, in reality the crime decline 
debate remains largely unresolved and the trends are “murkier” than much of the existing 
literature suggests (Baumer and Wolff, 2014). 
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Data from the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) tend to confirm the 
downward trend as well: in the United States, “[p]roperty victimization [in 2010] fell to 
the lowest levels since 1993” (Truman, 2011, p. 7).  Questions about the experience of 
identity theft, defined as an unauthorized use of an account, an unauthorized attempt to 
create a new account, or another fraudulent use of personal information, were only added 
to the National Crime Victimization Survey in 2004, however, and thus trend data only 
exist for the period after the most dramatic crime decline had happened (Baum, 2006; 
Harrell & Langton, 2013).  According to the NCVS estimates, the number of households 
affected by identity theft has risen from 3.1% in 2004 to 7% in 2010, while the number of 
individuals affected rose from 5% of the population in 2008 to 7% in 2012 (See Table 1; 
Baum, 2004; Langton, 2011; Langton & Planty, 2010; Harrell & Langton, 2013). At the 
same time, Piquero and her colleagues concluded that the “number of households being 
victimized annually rang[es] between 5% and 25%” (Piquero, Cohen, and Piquero, 2011, 
p. 437).  These figures do contain some indication that identity theft rates are rising (see
Table 1).  Regrettably, however, neither source collected information regarding the mode 
of perpetration of the crimes in question.3 
The other nationally representative data source on identity theft, credit card fraud, 
and other forms of online fraud victimization is a longitudinal survey launched in 2003–
2004 by Javelin Strategy & Research, a private company (see Javelin, 2009).  The sample 
is a nationally representative rotating sample of about 5,000 U.S. adults, and the survey is 
3 It is important to underscore a critical difference in the ways the prevalence of online property crime is
measured in available sources.  Whereas the NCVS measures the ‘number of victimizations’ per 100 
individuals aged 12+, the data do not account for whether the same or different individuals were 
victimized. As a result, the numbers do not actually tell us what percentage of individuals are affected by 
online property crime, but only the rate at which victimization incidents occurred. The best estimates for 
the rates at which people are actually affected by online property crime suggest it affects between 4.4% and 
6.0% of the adult population annually (Javelin Strategy & Research, 2012), or between 5.5% and 7.3% of 
households nationally, according to NCVS data (Langton, 2011).  
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conducted annually. Reports detailing the results of the survey have been issued every 
year since 2005 (see Table 1). 
  [Table 1 about here] 
Javelin sought to break down its 2008 data on identity theft by method of perpetration, an 
effort which was hampered by the fact that 65% of victims in that year did not know how 
their information had been obtained (Javelin, 2009).  Only 4% of victims knew they had 
lost their data online, while a further 4% believed it had been lost through a data breach.  
Meanwhile, fully 15% believed their identities had been compromised after their wallet 
was stolen.  Javelin’s conclusion, that most identity theft occurs offline, was in line with 
other research, but suffers from the flaw that victims of OPC are far less likely to know or 
understand how their information was compromised than are victims who are aware they 
lost their wallets. 
Fewer than 20% of the identity theft victims sampled by NCVS reported their 
victimization to law enforcement agencies (Langton and Planty, 2010).4 A similar 
estimate of reporting rates is derived by Copes and his colleagues (2010) from the second 
wave of a nationally representative National Public Survey on White Collar Crime 
conducted by the National White Collar Crime Center (NW3C) in 2005.  That survey 
found that 19.6% of identity theft and credit card fraud victims in their sample reported 
their victimization to a crime control agency (Copes et al., 2010, p. 1048). Results from 
the third wave of that survey, conducted in 2010, suggested 26% of victims of identity 
4 Interestingly, the U.S. Department of Justice has a section on their web site titled “What Should I Do If 
I've Become a Victim of Identity Theft?” It advises victims to report their victimization to the U.S. Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC) and several other organizations (for example, Internal Revenue Service, Social 
Security Administration, and credit reporting companies) but reporting to the police is not included in that 
list.  (http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/websites/idtheft.html, accessed 8/14/14). 
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theft or credit card fraud reported their victimization (Huff, Desilets, and Kane, 2010, p. 
16). 
[Table 2 about here] 
Table 2 summarizes the estimates of reporting to police derived from NCVS and 
the NW3C survey and compares them to the reporting of traditional property crime to 
police (based on NCVS data). Identity theft victimization is reported to police at a 
significantly lower rate – around 20% – compared to the proportion of people who report 
their victimizations from traditional property crime to police – about 40%, according to 
NCVS data (Truman, 2011). Moreover, one important consideration makes this 
difference in reporting a conservative estimate: neither NCVS nor the NW3C survey 
separate identity theft that is perpetrated online from that which results from “dumpster 
diving” or stealing mail from mailboxes. The real gap in reporting between OPC and 
traditional property crime may be even wider.  
Data from the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC), supplied by victimized 
consumers on a voluntary basis, help to add further insights when juxtaposed with those 
from NCVS (U.S. Federal Trade Commission, 2004, 2008, 2012). According to the FTC 
data, the percentage of people victimized by identity theft or fraud who notified police 
varied between 35% and 49% for the years 2001–2008.  An actual police report was filed 
in between 27% and 40% of cases depending on the year (see Table 2). However, the 
FTC data, besides having the same problem of non-separation of online crimes, also have 
another serious flaw: they clearly cannot be considered representative of all victims of 
fraud and identity theft, but rather represent (at best) only those individuals reaching out 
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to the data collection agency.5  The most that can be said for these data, therefore, is that 
among those who take the step of voluntarily reporting their victimization to the FTC, 
reporting to the police also appears more common. 
 Victims of internet-based crimes also have a separate venue for reporting: the 
Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) where complaints can be filed online and annual 
reports are produced summarizing the information received from the reporting victims 
(see the latest report in Internet Crime Complaint Center, 2013). These data seem to be 
useful for detecting certain fraud patterns and new fraud scenarios, which is helpful for 
law enforcement in connecting cases. IC3 data are also helpful in issuing warnings to 
consumers about the emerging threats and online frauds. At the same time, these data are 
much less useful in piecing together a comprehensive picture of online crime since the 
questions about the generalizability arise with IC3 data just as much, if not more, than 
with the FTC data. For example, plenty of complaints filed through IC3 are related to 
online auctions, which may be a result of eBay’s encouragement of its consumers to 
report to IC3 (see House of Lords Science and Technology Committee, 2007, p.110).  
 In sum, the picture from available data sources suggests that OPC affects a 
sizeable and growing proportion of households annually in comparison to traditional 
property crime, but that reporting rates to police are relatively low.  Moreover, OPC 
levels and trends are not counted at all in the FBI’s UCR metric, which is most 
commonly used to assess crime levels and trends in the United States.  Rather, the only 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 In addition, over the years of data collection, fewer and fewer consumers answer the question about 
reporting their victimization to police (less than half of people reporting their victimizations to FTC 
provided an answer about reporting it to police in 2009, 2010, and 2011), thus further undermining the 
generalizability of FTC data.   
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available sources for national estimates of the prevalence of the problem are victimization 
surveys.  Next, we assess the level of damage that OPC precipitates on its victims. 
THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE PROBLEM: HOW MUCH DOES OPC COST? 
Estimates of financial losses from online theft and fraud are compiled by Javelin 
Strategy & Research (2011), using a methodology closest to the one employed in 
calculating losses from traditional crime by the FBI in their annual Crime in the United 
States reports (U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2013). The results paint a picture 
that clearly shows losses from online crime far surpass those from traditional crime (see 
Table 3) and that the proportion of people or households financially affected by OPC is 
substantial.  
[Table 3 about here] 
By asking respondents to identify the date of their discovery of the loss and the 
‘approximate total dollar value of what the person obtained while misusing information’, 
Javelin computes a moving three-year average of monetary losses (except for years 2008 
and 2009, where only a standard one-year estimate was available at the time of report 
publication).  As can be seen from Table 3, the total losses vary within the range of $45 
billion to $60 billion yearly during the period of 2003–2009.  Table 3 also includes direct 
personal financial losses from identity theft, estimated using NCVS: these ranged from 
$14.4 billion to $16.5 billion annually over the same period of time. UCR estimates of 
monetary losses reported from the traditional property crimes such as burglary, 
larceny/theft, and motor vehicle theft, by comparison, range between $15.2 billion and 
$17.6 billion.  
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Three important considerations should be kept in mind when comparing these 
three sources of data on financial losses from property crime. First, the estimates from 
Javelin Strategy & Research include the losses borne out by the industry (banking 
institutions and merchants), whereas data from NCVS only include financial losses borne 
out by the private individuals. The lack of awareness among victims may mean the actual 
value of financial losses is higher, though difficult to estimate.6  According to the 
estimates by Gordon and his colleagues (2007), individuals constitute only approximately 
34% of the victims of identity theft, with financial industry organizations constituting 
over 37% of the victims, and retail businesses representing 20% (Gordon et al., 2007, p. 
3). Thus, individual victimizations only represent the tip of the iceberg in terms of 
financial losses. Different methodologies of calculating losses and different definitions of 
online crime (identity theft, credit/debit card fraud, etc.) lead to different estimates of per 
person and overall losses.  Moreover, surveys of individuals can bias estimates of losses 
upwards if the percentage of population affected is small and may not be represented 
well, even in fairly large samples (see Florêncio and Herley, 2013, for an excellent 
discussion of this issue). Taking these considerations into account, even if upwardly 
biased, the survey estimates could result in a figure that is a closer reflection of real 
losses to the industry.  
Second, the UCR estimates include financial losses from property crime against 
both individuals and organizations but only from the crimes that were reported to the 
police. Even though only less than half of all property crime is reported to the police 
6 As an example, based on a series of studies commissioned by Symantec and conducted by the Ponemon 
Institute (2012) where large U.S. companies (over 2000 employees per company) were surveyed, the 
average financial loss from data breach incidents per year per company is estimated to be $8.9 million. 
However, this estimate cannot be easily translated into a national total because of the method by which the 
sample was drawn. 
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(according to NCVS estimates), the figures for financial losses cannot be assumed to be 
representative of losses for all such crimes because one of the main reasons some 
property crimes are not reported to law enforcement is the insignificance of losses (as 
described above, in the section on prevalence of OPC). However, to adjust for this 
possibility, a crude estimate is offered in Table 3 as a proxy – the doubling of the 
officially reported losses. Even adopting this liberal approach, which likely overstates the 
true amount of total losses from traditional property crime adjusting for non-reporting, 
the resulting estimates are still much lower than the estimated direct losses caused by 
identity theft (see Table 3).   
To summarize, the financial losses attributable to identity theft appear far in 
excess of the damage inflicted by traditional property crime, though there is no clear 
indication of the role of online perpetration in these data, or of whether levels of online 
perpetration are rising or falling in recent years.  Nevertheless, we believe the data 
reviewed above do constitute a prima facie case that OPC rates and losses may be 
comparable to, or even greater than, those from traditional property crime in recent years.  
PUZZLE FOR THE NEW AGE: HOW SHOULD WE COUNT ONLINE PROPERTY 
CRIME? 
The UCR was designed to count the kinds of direct contact predatory crimes 
typical of the 1940’s and 1950’s, where victims and offenders came together in time and 
space.  Today, victims and offenders can meet in cyberspace and the authorities that may 
be able to do something about it are often private corporations rather than police, who 
have traditionally generated crime statistics. The possibility arises that the crime drop is a 
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consequence, in part, of an incremental shift of criminal behavior out from under police 
surveillance or auspices, and into the online realm.  Present data render this proposition 
untestable, but of critical importance to researchers. 
Given the substantial number of people affected and the huge amounts of 
financial losses caused, as well as the organized nature of crime markets for online theft, 
the U.S. criminal justice system needs a better way to incorporate information about OPC 
into its statistics on trends and patterns of crime. It’s dangerous for researchers to come 
up with explanations for the crime drop by building theories based on assumptions about 
the nature of crime that are increasingly outdated, because the trends in criminality may 
be incorrectly described.  The implication is a profound one: widespread criminological 
concern about the ‘crime drop’ may be based on misconceptions about the extent or even 
the existence of that drop itself.  Next, we contemplate the challenges that will beset any 
attempt to incorporate online property crime into generalized crime measures. 
Most attempts to count crime involve making the critical decision to count either 
incidents of offending or victimization, and OPC is no exception. 
[Table 4 about here] 
One successful security breach of a network may only be a single offense, but its 
effects on victims may be widespread if millions of data records containing personal 
information are accessed by the hackers.  Such a crime may expose millions of people to 
becoming potential victims of identity theft or account fraud (see Table 4 for the 
incidents with the largest volumes of financial/personal information exposed).  Yet each 
data breach incident of this kind may be perpetrated by just a few offenders, or only one 
offender may be involved at the initial stage. Thus, depending on what one counts, the 
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numbers of offenses may differ from the number of offenders or victims by orders of 
magnitude. 
Among traditional types of crime, very few are characterized by such a massive 
asymmetry between the numbers of offenders and victims.  A rare exception to this rule 
is Bernie Madoff’s ‘Ponzi scheme’, which is an unusual example of a traditional property 
crime of fraud. In that extraordinary case, thousands of individuals, plus thousands of 
organizations, can be counted among the victims while there are only a handful of 
offenders. It seems that separate (and often very disparate) counts need to be compiled 
for victims, offenders, incidents, and financial losses, each of which might be considered 
a valid measure in the context of an attempt to measure the extent of crime and the harm 
it causes. Below, we will consider each of these categories and describe possible 
solutions for counting. 
Data on OPC offenders are, if anything, likely to be the hardest to calculate.  The 
time and space constraints (Cohen and Felson, 1979) that govern most of the traditional 
crime are substantially relaxed for OPC. Offenders may, and often do, reside in other 
countries halfway across the globe, whereas victims may be U.S. residents and 
businesses. Such crimes are particularly hard to solve, making data collection on 
offenders very complex. While certain offenders may be caught and portrayed in media, 
the profile of such individuals is likely to be highly unrepresentative of offenders 
generally.  In short, data on offending itself is likely to be very hard to come by, and may 
transgress certain assumptions that underlie the attempt to produce a ‘national’ estimate 
of OPC prevalence. 
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The counting of victims also poses conceptual challenges.  According to Newman 
(2003), “over 90% of people report their lost or stolen card to the card issuer within one 
day” (p. 8). In such cases, if a person suffered no financial losses because the credit card 
company reversed any unauthorized charges, can the credit card holder be considered – 
and counted as – a victim of OPC? Does it depend on whether the person was even aware 
of the unauthorized charges? What if s/he was made aware of the situation only after the 
credit card company resolved the issue? The parallel with traditional types of crimes 
would be an ‘attempted’ crime. Should we then consider the individuals exposed to OPC 
but bearing no financial damage as ‘potential victims’ or ‘victims of attempted crime’ 
and only count the credit card company as an actual victim? Additionally, how is one to 
classify the victim whose financial information is stolen but never exploited, for whatever 
reason? Measures of victimization are particularly ineffective around incidents such as 
those where the putative ‘victim’ either suffers no harm at all, or is unaware of what has 
happened. These are the questions that need to be resolved for the purpose of developing 
a system of consistent OPC data. 
An additional challenge results from the fact that businesses affected by OPC may 
be unwilling to come forward with information, in the effort to preserve their reputation 
and their customers’ trust: 
Banks and creditors typically do not notify the police about identity thefts, and 
police do not contact banks and creditors—and even if police did contact banks and 
creditors, there are no established procedures for the transfer of relevant 
information. […] In fact, there are indications that the private sector would rather 
keep this type of identity theft private, electing to address the control of the problem 
on its own. Many credit card companies and financial institutions view identity theft 
through a cost-benefit analysis, and the costs of implementing anti-identity theft 
measures exceed their benefits.      (White and Fisher, 2008, p. 10) 
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 Other researchers also confirm the desire to conceal commercial victimization 
through data breaches (Clarke and Newman, 2002; Smith, 1999; Taylor, 2002), and add 
that managers may doubt the ability of police to deal with the crime, which would require 
technologically advanced knowledge or equipment.  
 As a partial remedy for this problem, data breach laws requiring businesses to 
report any substantial security breaches have been passed in almost all U.S. states in the 
last 10 years, starting with California that passed the first law of this kind in 2002. As of 
April 2014, 47 states – with the exception of Alabama, New Mexico, and South Dakota – 
had enacted security breach laws (National Conference of State Legislatures, 2014). As a 
result, the reporting of security breaches has improved (for more on the effectiveness of 
data breach laws, see Romanosky et al., 2011).   
 There is also a centralized database provided by a non-profit organization relying 
on volunteers that accumulates information on security breaches and on the number of 
personal and financial records exposed to online theft – DataLossDB.org project (Open 
Security Foundation, n.d.). Figure 1 plots the DataLossDB records of reported data 
breach incidents on a timeline: monthly number of incidents from 2005 to mid-2014 
(latest available when the article went to press), regardless of the number of records 
stolen or exposed in each incident. In the period between 2009 and 2013, the increase 
looks exponential. Symantec (2012) estimates that in 2011, on average, 1.1 million 
identities got exposed per breach incident (p. 9), compared to 260,000 in 2010 
(Symantec, 2011, p. 6).  
[Figure 1 about here] 
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Finally, when it comes to counting losses from OPC, the problem is similar to that 
of arson: sometimes, arson results in very little damage (if fire does not spread or is put 
out quickly) and sometimes damages run into millions of dollars. Often, external factors 
which have nothing to do with the offenders or their intent determine the amount of 
losses. To resolve (or rather avoid) this problem, UCR data on property crime exclude 
arson all together from loss calculations. For OPC, the amount of actual losses can be 
calculated only if a mechanism is developed to gather information from both individuals 
and organizations. However, a mandatory reporting system for financial losses is very 
unlikely to be implemented unless the government provides a financial incentive to 
disclose this information (for example, in the form of tax breaks or loss write-offs tied to 
the requirement of mandatory disclosure). Another possible solution to this problem can 
come in the form of mandatory insurance against online fraud that would be required of 
any businesses with substantial online presence or possibility of exposing customer data 
through online security breaches. A certain level of online security would be required to 
purchase the insurance (with discounts for a higher level of security) and the reporting of 
security breaches (to the insurer or to special investigative divisions) would be a 
mandatory requirement for collecting on the insurance. This method might ensure high 
rates of reporting – similarly to what we see with motor vehicle theft (according to the 
U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (2013), the theft of motor vehicles is one of the 
most consistently highly reported property crimes). 
Otherwise, the only viable option of gathering data on organizations’ financial 
losses from OPC is the one that has been implemented by the Bureau of Justice Statistics 
(BJS) in collaboration with the RAND Corporation in the National Computer Security 
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Survey (NCSS) (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2006). The survey has been devised to 
collect information from business organizations about their cybercrime victimization 
experiences. Despite the strong sampling procedure that was intended to produce solid 
national estimates (a stratified, random sample of nearly 36,000 businesses was selected), 
the response rate to this survey was only about 23%. Such a low response rate calls into 
question the generalizability of any estimates obtained from the survey, especially since it 
is not clear whether the businesses that responded were more or less or equally likely to 
be victimized compared to the businesses that gave no response to the survey.  
 It is also important to make a distinction between two types of cybercrime against 
organizations: 1) malicious attacks that are most similar to vandalism – computer viruses, 
denial of service, and other attacks designed to bring damage to the systems without the 
intent to profit financially from such damage, and 2) cybercrime that is perpetrated with 
the explicit intent to profit (designated as cyber theft in the BJS report (Rantala, 2008)). 
These two types of OPC (cyber-vandalism and cyber-theft) may have very different 
origins and types of perpetrators but both cause substantial financial losses to the 
organizations targeted.  
 
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS: THE COUNTER-TRENDS AND INVISIBLE LINKS 
 While data and research in the area are incipient, the analysis above suggests there 
is ample reason to devote greater attention to counting OPC in order to assess whether the 
explosion in online property crime in the United States is so great as to reverse the 
commonly observed ‘crime drop’ since the mid-1990s.  The data presented here suggest 
that the rate at which United States residents are now affected by OPC actually outstrips 
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that of traditional property crime, which continues to fall.  Moreover, the amount of 
financial harm they suffer is far greater in dollar amounts than that inflicted by traditional 
property crime.  Existing data allow us to suggest the possibility that this ‘wave’ in crime 
may override any benefits Americans have enjoyed as a result of the steady drop in 
traditional forms of property crime recorded in the UCR. 
 The counting of OPC remains a complex enterprise, however, and is bedeviled by 
the one question that has confronted criminologists when it comes to counting crime 
throughout history, namely: what is the unit to be counted?  Conceptually, OPC may 
present many fascinating issues, but for counting purposes there is really only one 
problem – how is one crime distinguished from another?  In this regard, counting OPC, 
whether by offenses, offenders or victims, really requires criminologists to ask the same 
questions.  Criminologists have traditionally counted discrete acts as separate ‘crimes,’ 
but have consistently wrestled with the conundrum of how to count criminality which is, 
in effect, spread out over several acts such as spree or serial/repeat offenses.  Of course, 
the effect of a decision to count a series of offenses as ‘one’ offense has a radical effect 
on crime counts.  OPC is no different in this regard, though the ability to collect millions 
of records in a single data breach raise the possibility that the measurement implications 
are much more dramatic.  With offenders operating computer systems that seek 
continually to hack and subsequently to exploit personal data, it is hard to say when one 
offense ends and another begins.  Stealing credit cards may be one criminal act, but in 
using them one may commit many more. 
 When it comes to counting ‘the victim’ and, relatedly, ‘the victimization’, the 
same problem occurs.  Clearly, victims are a diverse group and victimizations vary in 
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their financial impact, but for counting purposes the real challenge is saying where one 
victim, and one victimization, begins and ends.  Recall that in the case of arson, the FBI 
has given up on calculating losses because it seems unreasonable to attribute the losses 
from a fire that burns out of control to a single offense.  But there is no really logical 
basis for this decision, except to say that calculating losses in this way would produce 
wildly disparate estimates of losses occasioned by arson that might in some way distort 
the appearance of how serious the problem really is.  In the same way, OPC victims may 
experience losses from their experiences that go far beyond the financial.  They may 
suffer personal inconvenience as they try to piece their lives back together, or other 
collateral financial consequences as credit ratings drop or checks bounce.  Arguably one 
can go much further than this: victims might suffer psychological problems, as may the 
people around them who experience the trauma vicariously.  Even readers of this article 
may be victims should they experience some increment of anxiety in contemplating the 
extent of OPC.  For counting purposes, then, where does one stop?  If one is to count the 
number of victims or characterize the extent of victimization, one has to draw some 
limits, even in the knowledge that such limits are necessarily arbitrary. 
Finding a way to compute OPC rates of either prevalence or harm in a way that 
permits them to be ‘compared’ or ‘collated’ in some way to figures related to traditional 
property crime may one day be possible, therefore, but only after a series of decisions has 
been made on how to define the units of count in ways that are broadly acceptable to the 
criminological community.  The sense in which these figures can indeed be ‘collated’ 
meaningfully with existing measures such as the UCR ‘index crime’ rate, however, will 
depend heavily not only upon the compatibility of the counting rules with those 
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employed for traditional crime (about which there will no doubt be considerable debate) 
but also whether criminologists themselves can be convinced that such a collation is wise. 
 
Stepping back from the conceptual issues that this question elicits, however, one can at 
least return to the preliminary assertion that underlies this paper: namely that increases in 
OPC may not only be large enough to merit policy attention but also that they may exist 
in contrasting relation to trends in traditional property crime.  As artefactual as such a 
relationship may be and as tentative as the suggestion must be, given the state of existing 
data, one urgent question may be to examine the data further for any such relationship 
and the mechanisms that might underlie it.  Obviously, there are many possible causal 
relationships between OPC and traditional property crime, including some compatible 
with the suggestion that their countervailing trends are evidence of some interaction.  We 
can speculate that engrossment in online media may cause criminals to change their 
methods strategically.  Simultaneously, fewer real-world interactions may occur, 
reducing opportunities for traditional property crime to occur.  The theoretical 
implications of such relationships for our understanding of the crime drop itself may be 
multi-faceted and certainly warrant further exploration.  For example, some direct-contact 
predatory crimes may turn violent precisely because of the proximity of the offender and 
victim in time and space.  This is not so true for cyber predatory crimes since the two 
never meet in person. So, one indirect consequence of property crimes occurring online 
could be a drop in the violent crime rate.  Of course, some violent crimes may occur 
online as would be the case with cyber bullying and sexual predators of minors.  But they 
may also escape the notice of the police. Alternatively, time spent online by most youth 
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of the peak crime-prone age is seen by some researchers as a self-incapacitation 
mechanism, leading to the decrease in traditional crimes (Ward, 2011). 
In short, available data raise the possibility OPC is a growing problem and that, 
whether incorporated into index crime measures or not, criminologists would be wise to 
be circumspect before declaring that crime has dropped as radically as traditional 
measures appear to reflect.  The scope for new measurement techniques to capture OPC 
is clearly wide, as work in the area has barely begun and definitional questions remain 
pressing.  Most importantly, however, the theoretical implications of incorporating an 
understanding of OPC into observations of crime trends generally are that criminologists 
must revisit the fundamental assumptions that have underpinned approaches to measuring 
crime that stretch back for the entire history of the discipline. 
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Table 1.  National Estimates of Incidence/Prevalence of Identity Theft and Traditional 





















rate per 100 
population aged 
12+ 
2003 4.7 3.6 - 16.3 
2004 4.3 3.5 3.1 16.1 
2005 4.0 3.4 5.5 15.4 
2006 3.7 3.3 - 16.1** 
2007 3.6 3.3 6.6 14.7 
2008 4.3 3.2 5.0* 13.5 
2009 4.8 3.0 7.3 12.7 
2010 3.5 2.9 7.0 12.0 
_____________________ 
* refers to individuals, not households (a different method was employed)
** data for 2006 NCVS were gathered using a different methodology and should be 
interpreted as a part of the series with caution 
Sources of data: Javelin Strategy & Research; Uniform Crime Reports (Crime in the 
United States); National Crime Victimization Survey 
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Table 2.  Percent of Victims Who Notified Police or Contacted Law Enforcement to 
Report Victimization 























reported to a 
crime control 
agency 
2001 49% 40% 37% - - 
2002 45% 36% 40% - - 
2003 40% 31% 38% - - 
2004 39% 30% 39% - - 
2005 40% 30% 40% - 20% 
2006 38% 30% 38% - - 
2007 35% 27% 37% - - 
2008 36% 28% 40% 17% - 
2009 (73%) (62%) 39% - - 
2010 (72%) (62%) 39% - 26% 
2011 (70%) (57%) 37% - - 
_____________________ 
Note: Data in parentheses should be interpreted with caution since they are based on the 
information gathered from less than half of the ID theft victims who contacted the FTC 
directly (the rest of the victims did not provide information about law enforcement 
contact). For example, 81% of victims provided this information in 2008 but only 42% of 
victims did so in 2009 and subsequent years.  
Sources of data: FTC (2004, 2008, 2012); NCVS (2001–2011); Copes et al. (2010); Huff 
et al. (2010). 
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UCR, all property 



















in billion $ 
monetary loss, 
in billion $ 
2003 $58 $17.0 $34.0 - $14.4 
2004 $60 $16.1 $32.2 - $14.7 
2005 $57 $16.5 $33.0 $10.4 $15.6 
2006 $50 $17.6 $35.2 - $16.5*** 
2007 $45 $17.6 $35.2 $14.5 $16.1 
2008 $48 $17.2 $34.4 $16.6** $16.2 
2009 $54 $15.2 $30.4 $13.3 - 
____________________ 
* to adjust for non-reporting using a conservative approach
** direct losses only  
*** data for 2006 NCVS were gathered using a different methodology, should be 
interpreted as a part of the series with caution 
Sources of data: Javelin Strategy & Research; Uniform Crime Reports (Crime in the 
United States); National Crime Victimization Survey 
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Table 4.  Twelve Largest Domestic Incidents of Security Breaches Officially Reported in 












Customers’ names and 
IDs, encrypted credit 
card numbers and 
passwords 




personal addresses and 
phone numbers, DOB 
Hack 2014-05-21 eBay Inc. 
130,000,000 Credit card numbers Hack 2009-01-20 
Heartland Payment 
Systems, Tower Federal 





numbers, and credit 
card info 
Hack 2013-12-18 
Target Brands, Inc., 
Fazio Mechanical 
Services, Inc. 
94,000,000 Credit card numbers Hack 2007-01-17 TJX Companies Inc. 
77,000,000 Personal info, possibly credit card info Hack 2011-04-26 Sony Corporation 





Account info, personal 
info, encrypted credit 
card numbers Hack 
2011-11-10 Steam (Valve, Inc.) 
32,000,000 Account info (user names and passwords) Hack 2009-12-14 RockYou Inc. 
26,500,000 
Personal info (name, 




U.S. Department of 
Veterans Affairs 
24,600,000 
Personal info, bank 






24,000,000 Personal info, account info Hack 2012-01-15 Zappos 
________________ 
Source of data: Open Security Foundation (www.DataLossDB.org) 
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